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Synthetic biology gives rise to ethical implications. These are already well 
recognised, with an ever-increasing academic and lay literature and growing 
attention from policy-makers. What is less clear is whether analysis of ethics in 
synthetic biology should be ‘exceptional’. That is, is there anything about 
synthetic biology that justifies a distinctive ‘ethics of’ approach? Likewise, what 
may or may not be fruitful directions for useful bioethical inquiry in synthetic 
biology remains under-explored. This paper first synthesises ethical issues 
arising in synthetic biology. A claim is then advanced that while a purely 
exceptionalist approach to ethics and synthetic biology is unwarranted, the field 
nevertheless requires engagement with ethics. Initial suggestions are put 
forward as to how this might be achieved. The paper then determines several 
hitherto under-explored lines of enquiry which serve to both further useful 
discussions of synthetic biology and contribute to the wider project of ethical 
engagement in emerging technologies. 
 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
Synthetic biology involves the deliberate application of engineering principles to well-
defined molecular components to synthesise novel or augment existing biological entities.1 
One aim of this research area is to extend previously limited biological functionalities, or 
create entirely new ones, in a standardised, defined, and reproducible way. Synthetic biology 
has become possible due to rapid advances in technologies such as DNA synthesis and 
engineering.2 While its practical applications remain putative, its theoretical utility is almost 
limitless. This combination of research approaches, and its broad array of uses in medicine 
and the environment, makes synthetic biology a potentially disruptive technology.3 
 
This paper will address three interlinked topics. First, the ethical issues that arise, or are 
likely to arise, in synthetic biology research and its applications are synthesised. As Link has 
pointed out, these may not be ‘debates’ as such – discussions regarding ethical issues in the 
development and application of synthetic biology have been directed more towards 
*     BSc(Hons); LLB(Hons); PhD; Senior Lecturer in Bioethics, Centre for Values, Ethics & Law in Medicine 
(VELiM), School of Public Health, University of Sydney. Parts of this paper draw on research undertaken as 
part of the SYBHEL project Synthetic Biology for Human Health: Ethical and Legal Issues (SiS-2008-1.1.2.1-
230401), funded by the European Commission. The author thanks all collaborators in this project, in 
particular Professor Ruud ter Meulen, A M Calladine and Dr Anna Deplazes-Zemp.  
1     There is no single definition of synthetic biology that is adopted by all who identify as researchers in this field. 
The description offered in this paragraph is the author’s own, based on eight years working in the field. 
However, a range of definitions of synthetic biology are used in practice. See, eg, News Feature, ‘What’s in a 
Name?’ (2009) 27 Nature Biotechnology 1071, 1071–3; Alexander Kelle, ‘Synthetic Biology as a Field of Dual-
Use Bioethical Concern’ in Brian Rappert and Michael J Selgelid (eds), On the Dual Uses of Science and Ethics 
(Australian National University ePress, 2013) 45, 46–49. Other papers in this special issue of the Macquarie 
Law Journal (MqLJ) also define synthetic biology. 
2     Jing Liang, Yunzi Luo and Huimin Zhao, ‘Synthetic Biology: Putting Synthesis into Biology’ (2011) 3 Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Systems Biology and Medicine 7, 8–10. 
3     James Manyika et al, ‘Disruptive Technologies: Advances That Will Transform Life, Business, and the Global 
Economy’ (Report, McKinsey Global Institute, May 2013) 4.  
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anticipating potential issues. 4  Public attitudes to this technology have generally been 
positive. 5 However, groups that champion environmental and other interests have also 
shown an interest in synthetic biology.6 This scrutiny of the field will no doubt continue.   
 
The paper then examines two interrelated questions: the novelty of ethical issues arising in 
synthetic biology, and whether its ethical analysis should be regarded as exceptional. Both 
questions are answered in the negative. However, synthetic biology does give rise to ethical 
issues and, as such, warrants attention in the discipline of bioethics. Building on this 
discussion, the third part of the paper then discusses some possible future directions for 
ethical analysis in synthetic biology.  
 
The paper concludes that there is unlikely to be one straightforward proclamation about the 
acceptability of synthetic biology. The challenge for bioethics is to develop a reasoned 
response to synthetic biology that can account for the field’s novelty and promise, while at 
the same time not simply reiterating issues that have been raised in other contexts.  
 
II  ETHICS AND SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 
 
This section will review and synthesise the ethical aspects of synthetic biology and its 
applications to date. Generally, ethical issues discussed in synthetic biology have not been 
raised in an attempt to prevent this field of research (unlike in similar fields such as genetic 
modification). Rather, engagement and bidirectional dialogue between ethicists, researchers 
and funders have prevailed.7  
 
Deliberation over ethical issues has been included in the field of synthetic biology in 
numerous ways. For example, ethics has been included in programmes for synthetic biology 
conferences.8 Research funders providing dedicated resources for synthetic biology research 
have required researchers to address ethical, legal and social implications.9 An increasing 
number of reports are considering the ethical and policy implications of synthetic biology.10 
 
The majority of ethics work has evaluated the synthetic biology as a field.11  That is, ethical 
analysis has tended to examine the implications of synthetic biology research as a whole, as 
4     Hans-Jürgen Link, ‘Playing God and the Intrinsic Value of Life: Moral Problems for Synthetic Biology?’ 
(2013) 19 Science and Engineering Ethics 435, 436. 
5     See, eg, Suzanne King and Tara Webster, ‘Synthetic Biology: Public Dialogue on Synthetic Biology’ (Report, 
Royal Academy of Engineering (UK), June 2009), 15, 23, 28, 39. 
6     See, eg, ETC Group (Canada), ‘Extreme Genetic Engineering: An Introduction to Synthetic Biology’ (Report, 
Jan 2007). 
7     See, eg, Paul Rabinow, ‘Assembling Ethics in an Ecology of Ignorance’ (Paper presented at Synthetic Biology 
1.0, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge MA, 11 June 2004) 
<http://syntheticbiology.org/Synthetic_Biology_1.0/Speakers.html>.  
8     See, eg, Rabinow, above n 7; Synthetic Biology 3.0, (24-26 June 2007) 
<http://www.syntheticbiology3.ethz.ch/extra/SBProceedings.pdf>; See generally Synbio.org (2015) 
<http://syntheticbiology.org/Conferences.html>, which provides a list of previous conferences in synthetic 
biology.  
9     See, eg, Philip Shapira and Abdullah Gök, ‘UK Synthetic Biology Centres Tasked with Addressing Public 
Concerns’, The Guardian (online), 30 January 2015 < http://www.theguardian.com/science/political-
science/2015/jan/30/uk-synthetic-biology-centres-tasked-with-addressing-public-concerns>. 
10    See, eg, Andrew Balmer and Paul Martin, ‘Synthetic Biology: Social and Ethical Challenges’ (Institute for 
Science and Society, University of Nottingham, May 2008); Erik Parens, Josephine Johnston and Jacob 
Moses, ‘Ethical Issues in Synthetic Biology: An Overview of the Debates’ (Woodrow Wilson International 
Centre for Scholars, 2009); Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues (US), New Directions: 
The Ethics of Synthetic Biology and Emerging Technologies (2010). 
11    Patrick Heavey, ‘Integrating Ethical Analysis “Into the DNA” of Synthetic Biology’ (2015) 18 Medicine, 
Healthcare and Philosophy 121, 121. 
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opposed to critiquing individual projects or applications within it. There are likely several 
reasons for this. First, when ethical analysis within synthetic biology commenced, not a great 
deal was known about particular applications and so it was necessary to take a broad 
approach. Second, synthetic biology has some novel unifying features. Despite there being no 
single definition or approach, these ‘new’ features provide a basis for ethical analysis.12 
Third, while individual projects in synthetic biology are beginning to give rise to novel data 
and results, such projects are more fundamental (and perhaps aligned with more ‘standard’ 
research in disciplines such as chemistry or physics) and may not have any significant ethical 
relevance beyond questions such as research integrity. Fourth, undertaking implications-
based assessments of individual projects may not give much scope for novel ethical inquiry. 
Finally, there is much about synthetic biology when viewed as a field that is ethically 
relevant and interesting. For example, agenda-setting and reflection on modes of working 
can and should be subject to ethical inquiry.13 Analyses are commencing to determine how 
the field as a whole should move forward. Looking at synthetic biology as a field, the ethical 
and conceptual issues raised in the literature can be classified as follows: defining and 
creating life; biosafety and biosecurity; benefit sharing; professional ethics and integrity; and 
regulation and policy-making. Each of these considerations will now be synthesised. 
 
A Synthetic Biology and the Definition and Creation of ‘Life’ 
 
Synthetic biology has already been used to generate a synthetic genome,14 and efforts to 
synthesise minimal cells from simple organisms such as yeast are underway.15 While not yet 
possible, future research in synthetic biology could generate novel ‘living’ entities capable of 
activities such as self-replication, energy consumption and use. Potential applications of 
synthetic biology raise numerous philosophical and ethical questions, among them: (i) What 
properties should an entity possess in order for it to be termed ‘alive’? (ii) Is research in 
synthetic biology that gives rise to new biological entities that are alive warranted? (iii) 
Should the manner in which an entity came to be alive matter? (iv) If a living entity is 
created, at what point should that entity have rights normally ascribed to those possessing 
moral status and thus a right to life? It is beyond the scope of this paper to address these 
questions in depth, but each will be briefly considered.  
 
With respect to (i) the definition of life, or the properties that an entity should possess to be 
termed ‘alive’, there are claims in the literature that a single definition is not possible nor 
would such a definition be stable.16  
 
On question (ii), whether synthetic biology should be used to create new life forms, an 
absolutist approach is unlikely due to the varying kinds of entities that may be created in 
different contexts. Nevertheless, the question is a useful guide to the relevant ethical 
considerations. Those cautious about creating new life forms will point to the fact that as yet, 
12   This point is considered further in the final section of this paper. 
13   Thomas Douglas and Julian Savulescu, ‘Synthetic Biology and the Ethics of Knowledge’ (2010) 36 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 687, 687; Wendy Rogers, ‘Ethical Issues in Synthetic Biology: A Commentary’ (2015) 15 
Macquarie Law Journal 39. 
14   Daniel G Gibson et al ‘Creation of a Bacterial Cell Controlled by a Chemically Synthesized Genome’ (2010) 329 
Science 52. 
15   Jane Calvert and Emma Frow, ‘The Synthetic Yeast Project as a Topic for Social Scientific Investigation’ (2015) 
15 Macquarie Law Journal 27. 
16   Balmer and Martin, above n 10, 26–29; Editorial, ‘Meanings of “Life”: Synthetic Biology Provides a Welcome 
Antidote to Chronic Vitalism’ (2007) 447 Nature 1031, 1032. The European Commission has claimed that 
synthetic biology will give rise to calls for a more sophisticated definition of life. See New and Emerging 
Science and Technology (NEST) High-Level Expert Group, ‘Synthetic Biology: Applying Engineering to 
Biology’ (Project Report No EUR 21796, European Commission, 2005) 19 
<ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nest/docs/syntheticbiology_b5_eur21796_en.pdf>. 
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very little is known about the possible benefits. Although researchers have established key 
components of biological knowledge, such as the sequence of the human genome, research to 
determine the function of genes and regulation of gene expression in complex organisms is 
less developed. The risks associated with creating completely new organisms, particularly if 
they are to be released into the environment, should be carefully considered.17 There is also a 
concern that creating life may mechanistically reduce the complexities of life to engineering 
principles. 
 
In reply, it may be claimed that the benefits of creating new life forms should not be 
discounted before research is undertaken. Some synthetic biology researchers are working 
towards developing new life forms, but only on a small scale, and with careful design and 
oversight. Creating new life forms will also give rise to intrinsic biological knowledge, 
valuable in its own right. It may inspire awe in life’s complexity as opposed to viewing life 
mechanistically. While risk will be inherent when creating life, this on its own may not be 
enough to condemn the creation of new life forms, so long as there is accountability and risks 
are well assessed. 
 
Related to these questions is (iii), whether the manner in which an entity came to be alive 
should matter. It could be claimed that the properties of an entity denoting it as ‘living’ are 
all that are needed. Others, perhaps those who value the ‘natural’ or ‘naturalistic’ concepts of 
life, may argue that the mode of creation of a life and the intent in such creation are also 
important. However, a consensus seems to be emerging that the former of these positions is 
more relevant to ethical deliberation. Namely, we should look at the properties of an entity to 
determine its moral status, not how that entity was made. To this end, demarcating between 
‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ means of creating life is likely to be unhelpful and unnecessary.18 
 
The final question (iv) asks at what point a new life form created by synthetic biology attains 
moral status. This question is motivated by a concern that if synthetic biology can create new 
(and potentially complex) entities, then we need to know how to treat them. It may be 
ethically inappropriate to create new entities that have moral status, but then treat those 
entities poorly. If the answer to (iii) is that it is justifiable to separate ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ 
life forms, and to treat them differently depending on their origins, then this final question 
may be moot. However, consensus is emerging that the rights of artificially created living 
entities should not depend on their mode of creation.19 If correct, this means it would be 
inappropriate to apportion different ethical significance to entities created in different ways. 
If mode of creation is irrelevant to moral status, then the focus shifts to a more classic 
investigation as to the properties of a living entity that afford it moral status, and 
accordingly, certain rights. These properties remain contested, but may include sentience, 
the ability to feel pain, and the ability to conceive of oneself as a being with a past and a 
future.20 Mere biological life is not enough. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that not all 
living entities created through synthetic biology will have a status deserving of moral respect. 
 
 
17    This point is considered further in the discussion of ethical issues and policy and regulation in synthetic 
biology. 
18   David Heyd, ‘Is There Anything Unique in the Ethics of Synthetic Biology?’ (2012) 55 Perspectives in Biology 
and Medicine 581, 583–584, 586; Simon Heuksen, ‘Artificial Life and Ethics’ (2014) 8 Nanoethics 111, 112–
114; Thomas Douglas, Russell Powell and Julian Savulescu, ‘Is the Creation of Life Morally Significant?’ 
(2013) 44 Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 688, 696. 
19   Bernard Baertschi, ‘The Moral Status of Artificial Life’ (2012) 21 Environmental Values 5, 16–17; Link, above 
n 4, 437; Douglas et al, above n 18, 696. 
20   Ainsley Newson, ‘Personhood and Moral Status’ in Richard Ashcroft et al (eds), Principles of Health Care 
Ethics (John Wiley, 2nd ed, 2007) 277, 281–282. 
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B Biosafety and Biosecurity in Synthetic Biology 
 
Concerns around biosafety and biosecurity are prevalent in the synthetic biology literature.21 
Other papers in this edition have addressed current regulations pertaining to biosafety in an 
Australian context.22 From an ethical perspective, questions of biosafety and biosecurity can 
be framed as follows: What measures of safety are ethically appropriate for use in synthetic 
biology? How should nefarious and worthy applications of synthetic biology technologies be 
weighed and compared? 
 
Biosafety refers to containment and other measures put in place to ensure safe working with, 
and use of, potentially hazardous biological agents. Regarding biosafety measures, a key 
ethical rationale is protection from harm. It is important to ensure the products of synthetic 
biology do not leave populations or environments worse off. However, it is also important to 
note that not everything produced in synthetic biology research will have biosafety 
implications. Some products may be benign or not capable of infection.  
 
Ethical considerations will arise when a balance needs to be struck between regulating 
scientific conduct on biosafety grounds, which may impinge on scientific freedom, and 
facilitating open-ended research to encourage beneficial outputs. So-called ‘garage biology’ is 
one area where this balancing is relevant. The ‘component’ approach used in some domains 
of synthetic biology research lends itself to use by individuals who may not be working 
within a traditional sphere of scientific research, such as a university or research institute. 
Questions have been raised as to how the conduct and products of those undertaking garage 
biology should be monitored and controlled.23 Another cause for concern builds on the above 
issue of creating new life forms which may be capable of evolving and changing if and when 
they are released into the environment. Ethical deliberation may assist in determining the 
appropriate risk trade-offs and standards of conduct.  
 
Biosecurity can mean both the kinds of protections put in place to ensure biosafety, and the 
prevention and management of nefarious uses of synthetic biology. For example, with 
inexpensive DNA synthesis and publicly available virus sequences, it has been possible to 
construct virulent viruses using mail-order DNA fragments.24 
 
Ethical questions relevant to biosecurity include consideration of how to trade off beneficial 
and potentially harmful uses of the same technology. This is termed the ‘dual use’ problem. 
It applies in contexts where the same research can be used for ‘both good and bad purposes’, 
specifically ‘research that can be used for especially harmful purposes… where the 
consequences… would be potentially catastrophic.’25 Dual use problems are not unique to 
synthetic biology. However, synthetic biology offers a good prototype for their 
21    See, eg, Alexander Kelle, ‘Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity: From Low Levels of Awareness to a 
Comprehensive Strategy’ (2009) 10 EMBO Reports S23; Markus Schmidt et al, ‘A Priority Paper for the Social 
and Ethical Aspects of Synthetic Biology’ (2009) 3 Systems and Synthetic Biology 3, 4–5; Jonathan B Tucker 
and Raymond A Zilinskas, ‘The Promise and Perils of Synthetic Biology’ [2006] The New Atlantis 25 (Spring) 
32–34, 37–42; Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues (US), above n 10, 71–74, 129–131.  
22   Sonia Allan, ‘Macquarie University Workshop on Ethical, Legal and Social Issues Raised by Synthetic Biology’, 
(2015) 15 Macquarie Law Journal 5; Lisa Eckstein, ‘Regulatory Challenges of Synthetic Biology Trials and 
Other Highly Innovative Investigational Products’, (2015) 15 Macquarie Law Journal 65. 
23   Balmer and Martin, above n 10, 19–20. 
24   Jeronimo Cello, Aniko V Paul and Eckard Wimmer, ‘Chemical Synthesis of Poliovirus cDNA: Generation of 
Infectious Virus in the Absence of Natural Template’ 297 (2002) Science 1016. 
25   Michael J Selgelid, ‘Ethics and Dual-Use Research’ in Michael J Selgelid and Seamus Miller (eds), On the Dual 
Uses of Science and Ethics: Principles, Practices, and Prospects (Australian National University ePress, 2013) 
3, 4. 
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consideration.26 Douglas and Savulescu reflect on the deliberate misuse of synthetic biology 
and evaluate this dual use dilemma. They coin the term an ‘ethics of knowledge’ which asks 
‘whether to pursue and disseminate certain kinds of [potentially very harmful] knowledge’ 
even though benefits would also arise. 27 They claim that this question has so far been 
overlooked in synthetic biology, as it has been also for other emerging technologies. This 
approach would complement retrospective ethical analyses of the production of scientific 
knowledge, as well as prospectively help to resolve dual use problems.  
 
An ethics of knowledge for synthetic biology has not been universally endorsed. Pierce has 
critiqued this approach, pointing to a lack of consensus as to who should determine the 
ethics of knowledge. 28 She also rejects Douglas and Savulescu’s claim that this is a job 
(purely?) for ethicists.29 Pierce further points out the lack of clarity regarding whose interests 
such a consensus should serve,30 and concludes by pointing to the complex deliberative 
processes that would be required to develop a truly representative ethics of knowledge. 
Would determining acceptable and unacceptable knowledge actually achieve the objective of 
preventing deliberate harm, or would it merely give that illusion?31 As an alternative, Pierce 
suggests an ‘ethics of knowledge priorities’ to ask ‘about which resources we should generate 
and which should be our priorities, and under what conditions.’32 This approach is not solely 
guided by misuse, but by a range of considerations including resource allocation. 
 
C Benefit Sharing 
 
Ethical aspects pursuant to benefit sharing in synthetic biology include questions such as 
whether patenting an artificially synthesised genome is appropriate. For example, the J Craig 
Venter Institute, which produced the first minimal synthetic genome, patented the sequence 
of the minimal genome in 2007. 33  Taking a very different approach, the BioBricks 
Foundation has adopted an open-source model in which anyone can upload or download 
biological components.34 Questions also arise about the role of patents and other intellectual 
property in influencing pricing and availability of products of synthetic biology. For example, 
the medical and bioremediation applications of synthetic biology could have a significant 
impact in developing countries, especially where resources are low and needs are great.  
 
Another question, though one not unique to synthetic biology, is how benefits should be 
justly distributed. For example, concerns have been expressed that synthetic biology could, 
in the short term, undermine the livelihoods of communities producing natural products 
that synthetic biology could replace. The paradigmatic example here has been that of anti-
malarial drug artemisinin which is produced from a rare natural product by communities 
with minimal resources. Large-scale synthetic production of artemisinin is now all but a 
reality. While this could ease the global shortage of this much-needed drug, concerns have 
been expressed that synthetic artemisinin will be expensive and that the communities which 
currently produce the natural precursor will be worse off.35 
26   Kelle, above n 1, 62. 
27   Douglas and Savulescu, above n 13, 687, 692. 
28   Robin L Pierce, ‘Whose Ethics of Knowledge? Taking the Next Step in Evaluating Knowledge in Synthetic 
Biology: A Response to Douglas and Savulescu’ (2014) 38 Journal of Medical Ethics 636, 636–637. 
29   Ibid. 
30   Ibid 637. 
31   Ibid 637–638. 
32   Ibid 638. 
33   Minimal Bacterial Genome, US 20070122826 A1 <http://www.google.com/patents/US20070122826>. 
34   iGEM, Registry of Standard Biological Parts DNA Submission (2015) 
<http://parts.igem.org/DNA_Submission>. 
35   Balmer and Martin, above n 10, 25–26. 
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Hunter has explicitly considered the role of claims that rely on the concept of justice in 
debates over emerging technologies, using synthetic biology as an example.36 He claims that 
contrary to how they are often used, only rarely can justice considerations block the ingress 
of new technologies.37 Hunter argues that while justice should certainly guide how a new 
technology is introduced, it is often problematic in that those supporting them tend to take a 
short-term view.38 Instead, justice considerations regarding emerging technologies should be 
based on a long-term view, although he also claims that even justice concerns that take a 
longer-term view are not of concern for synthetic biology.39  
 
A potential solution to concerns of justice in synthetic biology is to build mechanisms of 
benefit sharing into the technology’s translation. In a different context, Schroeder has 
offered the following definition of benefit sharing for non-human resources: 
 
Benefit sharing is the action of giving a portion of advantages/profits derived from the use 
of non-human genetic resources or traditional knowledge to the resource providers, in 
order to achieve justice in exchange.40 
 
She then offers a separate definition of benefit sharing regarding human genetic resources: 
 
Benefit sharing is the action of giving a portion of advantages/profits derived from the use 
of human genetic resources to the resource providers to achieve justice in exchange, with 
a particular emphasis on the clear provision of benefits to those who may lack 
reasonable access to resulting healthcare products and services.41 
 
Schroeder justifies a two-definition approach on the basis that human genetic information is 
the common inheritance of humanity, whereas other resources are part of the sovereign 
rights of states. However, synthetic biology may challenge this dichotomous approach, or at 
least extend the application of the definition of human genetic resources to encompass 
chimeric resources. Synthetic biology may well see biological components or other artefacts 
being made that combine both human and non-human DNA. 
 
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that a laudable goal for synthetic biology is to reach 
end points at which benefit sharing is achieved and that this is done in line with a reasonable 
consensus definition of what it means to justly share those benefits. Where synthetic biology 
is used to negate the need for a natural resource (such as with the artemisinin example 
above), perhaps benefit sharing approaches could include assistance for those whose 
livelihoods in producing natural precursors have been affected. 
 
D Professional Ethics and Integrity in Synthetic Biology 
 
Given the open-endedness of research in synthetic biology and its applications, including 
possibly nefarious ones, engendering researcher responsibility and accountability is 
paramount. However, such a claim is not straightforward given the diverse methodologies 
and disciplines involved in synthetic biology, and the various cultural and other factors they 
incorporate. Engineering, for example, has historically been a discipline that has more 
overtly taught and addressed aspects of professional ethics, perhaps because many 
36   David Hunter, ‘How to Object to Radically New Technologies on the Basis of Justice: The Case of    Synthetic 
Biology’ (2013) 27 Bioethics 426. 
37   Ibid 428, 430. 
38   Ibid 433. 
39   Ibid 434. 
40   Doris Schroeder, ‘Benefit Sharing: It’s Time for a Definition’ (2007) 33 Journal of Medical Ethics 205, 207. 
41   Ibid 207, 208 (emphasis added). 
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engineering graduates end up working in the profession. This is not to say that those working 
in the pure sciences have acted unethically, but perhaps these kinds of considerations have 
been more implicit. It may be that synthetic biology cannot (and perhaps should not) have 
one professional ethics. Determining researcher responsibility may also lead to similar 
‘ethics of knowledge’ questions as those discussed above. 
 
Synthetic biology could give rise to biological components that self-assemble, self-replicate 
or display other properties usually associated with living entities. If these components are 
considered for use outside the laboratory, stakeholders need to feel confident that they have 
been produced by researchers who have the necessary expertise, who have made a 
commitment to act with integrity and who appreciate any sensitivities in their chosen field. It 
has been a very positive occurrence in synthetic biology that so many researchers have been 
prepared to engage with experts in social sciences, ethics and law to deliberate on the 
implications of their work. 
 
Beyond the initial question of acting ethically in scientific research, some are questioning 
whether professionalisation of the field of synthetic biology should be employed as a 
governance strategy.42 Professionalisation would involve a central body setting standards for 
elements of practice such as training and conduct. The body would likely comprise peer-
selected experts, thus promoting responsiveness to the community of researchers it will 
serve. Researchers seeking professional recognition would then be required to demonstrate 
adherence to these standards. The benefit of professionalisation is that it represents a 
compromise between internal and external regulation of conduct. That is, researchers would 
not be left to entirely self-regulate on an individual basis. Neither would researchers be 
subject to standards or limits that have been imposed from outside the discipline. The 
interests of broader stakeholders, such as community members and the state, could be 
incorporated into the standards that are set. Professionalisation would not be the only 
mechanism of governance, but would form part of a ‘web of prevention’ of improper 
conduct.43  
 
While attractive, professionalisation is a new concept for science. Questions will arise as to 
how to agree on standards and training requirements. This would be a big task, one likely to 
be resource intensive, considering the number of disciplinary approaches and techniques 
used in synthetic biology research. 
 
E How Should Synthetic Biology be Regulated? 
 
Potential regulatory or policy approaches, and possible gaps, regarding synthetic biology in 
an Australian context are discussed elsewhere in this issue.44 However, there are also ethical 
aspects to questions of regulation of synthetic biology as an emerging technology. One such 
question is whether synthetic biology should be regulated at all. An in-depth answer to this 
question is beyond the scope of this paper, so for the purposes of this discussion it will be 
assumed that synthetic biology, like many other fields of inquiry, is already subject to 
regulation and that a degree of external oversight is warranted. 
 
If it is correct to assume that synthetic biology does need regulatory oversight, a further 
question arises as to whether synthetic biology requires specific regulation. The answer to 
42   Lorna Weir and Michael J Selgelid, ‘Professionalization as a Governance Strategy for Synthetic Biology’ 
(2009) 3 Systems and Synthetic Biology 91, 94–96. Governance options for synthetic biology are briefly 
surveyed in the next section. 
43   Ibid 95–96. 
44   Allan, above n 22; Eckstein, above n 22. 
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this question is more complex. On the one hand, as Allan and Eckstein have shown, there is 
already a range of oversight relevant to synthetic biology in Australia. It is also prudent not 
to over-regulate or exceptionalise an emerging technology to the detriment of what that 
technology might achieve. The broad range of disciplines, methodologies and potential 
applications of synthetic biology (such as in health or environmental remediation) mean that 
specific laws or regulations may be insufficient to effectively monitor the entire field. On the 
other hand, it seems clear that synthetic biology could have detrimental outcomes if 
misapplied or if control is lost. Potentially problematic outcomes may be mitigated, and 
stakeholder confidence optimised, if there is specific oversight of synthetic biology. 
 
Assuming that some means of regulation will be put in place, even if just for the initial stages 
of the field’s emergence in Australia, a third question that will arise is which regulatory 
approach to adopt. A brief sketch of some of the predominant regulatory approaches and 
concepts follows.  
 
Three approaches to governance are anticipatory governance, adaptive governance and 
responsible research and innovation (RRI). All involve some kind of deliberative engagement 
with stakeholders. Anticipatory governance describes a set of procedural principles for how 
to collectively imagine, deliberate, design and influence emerging technologies.45 Adaptive 
governance involves analysis of different aspects (such as social and economic) that 
contribute to multi-level governance, and how these help build resilience in a particular 
society. It is an integrated and holistic theory. RRI encourages responsible practice in 
research and innovation, undertaking a transparent and interactive process.46 It involves 
collective stewardship now to protect the future. RRI has become a predominant framework 
in which to discuss regulation of emerging technologies, particularly in Europe, where a 
number of funders have built RRI considerations into funding documentation.47  
 
An alternative approach to these kinds of governance strategies is to have more informal 
oversight, or partnership between researchers and other stakeholders. In the United States, 
the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues suggested such a strategy 
when it recommended ‘prudent vigilance’ to oversee synthetic biology.48 This is a ‘middle 
way’ between having a moratorium, which was proposed and then rejected at the outset of 
synthetic biology research, and unfettered freedom of self-regulation. Self-regulation 
overlaps with the above discussion of professionalisation and ‘ethics of knowledge’. At the 
outset of a field that has the potential for controversy, complete self-regulation may not 
appease all stakeholders. 
 
Within the above governance approaches, questions will also arise as to how possible risks 
should be managed. Two broad principles relevant to synthetic biology are the precautionary 
and proactionary principles. 49  The proactionary principle commences with a ‘pro’ 
perspective on research, encouraging freedom to innovate on a strong evidence base. 
Proponents of this perspective aim to protect innovation and avoid costs arising from 
restrictions on research.  
45   David H Guston, ‘Understanding “Anticipatory Governance”’ (2014) 44 Social Studies of Science 218, 219. 
46   René von Schomberg, ‘Prospects for Technology Assessment in a Framework of Responsible Research and 
Innovation’ in Marc Dusseldorp and Richard Beecroft (eds), Technikfolgen Abschätzen Lehren: 
Bildungspotenziale Transdisziplinärer Methoden (Springer, 2012) 39, quoted in Richard Owen, Phil 
Macnaghten and Jack Stilgoe, ‘Responsible Research and Innovation: From Science in Society to Science for 
Society, with Society’ (2012) 39 Science and Public Policy 751, 753. 
47   See, eg, Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, Anticipate, Reflect, Engage and Act (AREA) 
(2015) <http://www.epsrc.ac.uk/research/framework/area/>. 
48   Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues (US), above n 10, 25–27, 123–140. 
49   Christopher Wareham and Cecilia Nardini, ‘Policy on Synthetic Biology: Deliberation, Probability, and the 
Precautionary Paradox’ (2015) 29(2) Bioethics 118; Parens et al, above n 10, 18–22. 
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The precautionary principle (PP) is widely applied in policy-making. In contrast to 
approaches more overtly favouring innovation, adopting the PP means that a technology or 
other innovation should not be widely applied until there is good evidence that it will be safe, 
or that the risks of its use will not outweigh its benefits. The PP is controversial in bioethics. 
Critiques of the principle include that it prioritises the current status quo, and that is stymies 
innovation due to inaction arising from any risk calculation that is inherent to applying the 
PP. In response, Wareham and Nardini present a modified PP49F that may mitigate these 
concerns.50 They describe a deliberative method for collectively arriving at a measure of 
probability of a harmful event, with a risk being able to be discarded if it falls below that 
level. They also describe a particular method of determining those risks.51 
 
Whatever approach to risk is taken in synthetic biology, there needs to be consideration of 
cooperative risk management to ensure the beneficial uses of synthetic biology will outweigh 
its possible misuse. 
 
III DOES SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY GIVE RISE TO NEW ETHICAL ISSUES, 
WARRANTING AN EXCEPTIONALIST APPROACH TO ETHICAL ANALYSIS? 
 
Having described and briefly analysed some of the ethical and regulatory issues that have 
arisen, or will likely arise, in synthetic biology research, this paper will now examine and 
critique approaches to the analysis of synthetic biology within bioethics generally. Two 
interrelated questions arise: (i) Does synthetic biology raise new ethical issues? (ii) Can and 
should there be a distinctive ‘ethics of’ synthetic biology?52 
 
The emergence of a new technology or disciplinary area in bioscience, medicine or health 
often brings with it a distinct ethical discussion and a slew of dedicated papers. For example, 
the literature is dotted with papers incorporating terms such as nanoethics, neuroethics and 
genethics. This kind of practice is subject to critique.53 It may lead to a repetition of previous 
debates, it could stymie creative reflection on emerging technologies, and it could fragment 
bioethics as a field of inquiry. 
 
This section is premised on a claim that there is a role for bioethics in discussions about 
synthetic biology. While this presumption is not uniformly accepted by all scientists working 
in synthetic biology,54  the over-arching consensus in the field is that the approaches and 
applications of synthetic biology have, and will continue to give rise to, ethical implications.55  
What will be apparent from the synthesis of ethical issues in synthetic biology presented 
above is that the types of issues, questions and approaches to which synthetic biology gives 
rise are already familiar to scholars in bioethics. 
 
This is not to say that there are no ethical issues arising from synthetic biology, or that the 
issues are settled. Synthetic biology will clearly have ethical implications in a number of 
domains. In one of the first reports written on the social and ethical implications of synthetic 
biology, Balmer and Martin recognised some of the novel aspects of the field of synthetic 
biology, stating that something ‘new and important’ is happening. 56  Heyd claims that 
50   Wareham and Nardini, above n 49, 121–123. 
51   Ibid, 123. 
52   Erik Parens, Josephine Johnston and Jacob Moses, ‘Do We Need “Synthetic Bioethics”?’ (2009) 321 Science 
1449.  
53   See, eg, Benjamin Wilfond and Vardit Ravitsky, ‘On the Proliferation of Bioethics Sub-Disciplines: Do We 
Really Need "Genethics" and "Neuroethics"?’ (2005) 5 American Journal of Bioethics 20, 20. 
54   Personal experience of author. 
55   Link, above n 4. 
56   Balmer and Martin, above n 10, 4, 29. 
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‘synthetic biology does not create any ethical dilemmas that have not already been raised’ but 
that ‘the issue is, nevertheless, ethically serious.’57 Likewise, Brassington has claimed that it 
‘seems plain that synthetic biology is something that ought to be taken seriously by 
policymakers.’58  
 
However, Brassington also claims ‘that there is nothing lacking from the philosophers’ 
toolkit that would be required to address [synthetic biology].’59 Synthetic biology is unlikely 
to give rise to novel ethical theory. That said, there is nothing wrong with applying known 
ethical concepts to new research domains, so long as scholars then also ‘dig deeper’,60 testing 
claims that have been made in previous debates (such as in relation to nanotechnology) and 
any consensus that has arisen, and assessing validity in the new field. There are also 
opportunities for methodological innovation in bioethics, including novel work on the role of 
visions and speculation when applied to emerging technologies.61  
 
It seems clear that synthetic biology does not present any completely new ethical issues, and 
that ethical analysis within synthetic biology should not be described as a discrete field of 
inquiry within bioethics. However, ethical questions, such as the best governance strategy or 
the appropriateness of an ‘ethics of knowledge’, have not yet been settled for synthetic 
biology, or indeed for other emergent and emerging technologies. There are several ethical 
issues and concepts relevant for synthetic biology, whether or not they have been initially 
raised elsewhere. There is much scope for rich analysis, and the open-endedness and 
capacity for creativity within synthetic biology offers opportunities for novelty. As Rogers 
writes, there is scope for reflecting on aspects of synthetic biology such as agenda setting, the 
partnership between ethics and science, and the attributes of researchers that ought to be 
encouraged.62 This will be a multi-dimensional process. Synthetic biology can draw on, and 
in turn influence, wider ethical and socio-political analyses of the place of technology in 
society. 
 
IV MOVING FORWARD: HOW MIGHT ETHICAL ANALYSIS  
IN SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY BE EXTENDED? 
 
A concern with ethical analysis of emerging technologies like synthetic biology is that 
analyses often become superficial lists of general issues that might arise. Indeed, this paper 
is liable to such a charge, although the intention here is not to examine a particular issue in 
depth but to scope out the current debate and indicate how it might progress. The problem is 
how to best analyse an emerging technology when its application remains more speculative 
than tangible. In the prior section it was suggested that synthetic biology does not give rise to 
novel ethical issues, nor should it be treated as a discrete field of academic inquiry. 
Nevertheless, synthetic biology offers plenty of opportunities for ethical analysis. In this final 
section, some suggestions are made as to how ethical analysis in synthetic biology could be 
extended. Three domains for analysis are briefly outlined: the use of imagination, questions 
of scope, and fine-grained integration of ethical analysis into synthetic biology research. 
 
57   Heyd, above n 18, 581. 
58   Iain Brassington, ‘Synthetic Biology and Public Health: Problems, Politics and Policy’ (2011) 1 Theoretical and 
Applied Ethics 34, 34. 
59   Ibid 39. 
60   Parens, Johnston and Moses, above n 52. 
61    This is addressed in the final section of this paper.  
62   Wendy Rogers, ‘Ethical Issues in Synthetic Biology: A Commentary’ (2015) 15 Macquarie Law Journal 42. 
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A The Use of Imagination, Vision and Speculation 
 
A criticism of bioethics scholarship on emerging topics is that when a new area of interest is 
identified, there is a flurry of activity to identify issues and publish papers before the next 
topic arises. Scholarship then moves on, yet ‘bioethics remains, disappointingly, familiar’.63 
One way this might be addressed is through augmenting how bioethics scholarship is 
approached, using imagination, vision or speculation to generate detailed ideas about the 
future of emerging technologies.64 This is not to say that imagined scenarios are going to be 
accurate, and there is controversy over how visions and speculation should be used in 
bioethics debates.65 However, even if an imagined scenario is incorrect it may still be of use. 
For example, while the swine flu pandemic was curtailed, the ethical deliberation over 
aspects of care such as resource allocation and risk-taking by healthcare staff provided 
valuable ethical insights and contributed to policy development. 
 
The rationale for using vision or speculation to critically reflect on synthetic biology is 
threefold. First, it may help prevent criticisms that bioethics is repetitive or constantly 
fragmenting.66 Second, it may encourage ethical debate in synthetic biology unconstrained 
by the current practical limitations and relative lack of real-world applications. Third, it 
reflects the fact that imagination and speculation are inherent to bioethics research. 
Delineating interesting ideas about the potential of synthetic biology in the future may assist 
in assessing relevant moral questions and concepts. 
 
B Analysing Questions of Scope in Synthetic Biology 
 
Related to considerations involving imagination, the open-ended potential of synthetic 
biology also has an ethical dimension. Synthetic biology offers unprecedented scope for 
innovation and application in a number of spheres ranging from health to the environment. 
This is both exciting and challenging. For example, synthetic biology may remove current 
limits on what life forms exist. This expansion in scope, as with other emerging technologies 
such as genome editing (a technology that has some overlap with synthetic biology), may 
provide a tipping point that requires us to critically reflect on the ethical implications, as well 
as considering whether current ethical and governance responses are satisfactory.67  
 
C A Finer-Grained Ethical Integration? 
 
Ethical analysis within synthetic biology has been characterised by scientific engagement 
with implications of this research right from the field’s inception. However, as might be 
expected, most analysis of ethical and social issues has been undertaken by those who work 
in these disciplines and not by synthetic biology scientists. There have been some exceptions, 
63   Angus Dawson, ‘The Future of Bioethics: Three Dogmas and a Cup of Hemlock’ (2010) 24 Bioethics 218, 218. 
64   This section is adapted from research undertaken for the SYBHEL project. See Sybhel, Synthetic Biology for 
Human Health: the Ethical and Legal Issues (2010) <http://sybhel.org/>. The author obtained funding for 
this project from the European Union (SiS-2008-1.1.2.1-230401). Research on the role of imagination in 
bioethics was carried out by Research Associate A M Calladine. 
65   See, eg, Gareth Jones, Maja Whitaker and Michael King, ‘Speculative Ethics: Valid Enterprise or Tragic Cul-
de-Sac?’ in Abraham Rudnick (ed), Bioethics in the 21st Century (InTech, 2011), 139, 147–154. 
66   This point has been discussed in Part III above. 
67   Ainsley Newson and Anthony Wrigley, ‘Identifying Key Developments, Issues and Questions Relating to 
Techniques of Genome Editing with Engineered Nucleases’ (Background Paper, Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 
2015), 7, 19 <http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/Genome-Editing-Briefing-Paper-Newson-
Wrigley.pdf>.  
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such as ‘sandpit’ funding initiatives, which have led to inter-disciplinary collaborations.68 In 
line with critiques of the ‘overview’ approaches to ethics and synthetic biology already 
discussed, some have claimed that integration of ethics into synthetic biology can go even 
further. Heavey, for example, suggests that each domain of synthetic biology needs in-depth 
ethical analysis to better account for the ‘everyday research’ occurring in synthetic biology.69 
This could comprise activities such as encouraging researchers to train in both the scientific 
and ethical aspects of their field. 70 These individuals could then take a leading role in 
assessing the implications of discrete projects in synthetic biology, ensuring that analysis of 
ethical implications is aligned with project expectations. Heavey additionally suggests that 
each research paper published in synthetic biology could contain a brief ethics statement, 
similar to existing requirements for papers reporting research with human participants.71 
 
While improving the integration of science and ethics in synthetic biology research is 
laudable, the strategies require further consideration. For example, is the claim for 
integration of ethics and science in synthetic biology unreasonably exceptionalising synthetic 
biology? Should this kind of approach be introduced to all science? Would requiring a ‘brief 
ethical evaluation’ on every synthetic biology manuscript (assuming what constitutes a 
synthetic biology manuscript can be determined) reduce ethical consideration to a box-
ticking exercise? 72  The objective and potential for integration show promise, but need 
development. 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has surveyed ethical issues arising in synthetic biology, before considering the 
mode and methodology for engagement with these ethical issues. It has claimed that 
synthetic biology neither raises entirely new ethical issues, nor represents a discrete sub-field 
of bioethical inquiry. However, the field does give rise to issues that are of ethical interest 
and will offer opportunities for analysis on aspects not yet fully explored. Some suggested 
avenues for further investigation were then put forward. These suggestions have been made 
in response to some ethically interesting hallmarks of synthetic biology, including its 
potentially limitless scope and the creativity that may be harnessed by researchers. The field 
may benefit from an approach to ethical analysis that is capable of both thinking about the 
broad possible future scenarios of synthetic biology, and also focusing in on some of the 
more specific implications that are probable or actual. Ongoing critical reflection on 
bioethics methodology in synthetic biology will also in turn allow critical reflection on 
methodology in bioethics more generally. It may also give rise to some novel observations, 
particularly given the inter-disciplinary nature of this field. Issues familiar to academic 
ethicists may play out in unexpected ways in different fields of research.71F73 Focus on the 
details of particular applications of research in synthetic biology will allow the development 
of a suite of thought experiments to guide further ethical analysis. 
 
68   CollectiveIP, ‘Sandpit’ to Address Grand Challenges in Synthetic Biology (2015) 
<https://www.collectiveip.com/grants/NSF:0935932>. Sandpit events are used to bring together researchers 
from a range of backgrounds to build collaborations and develop projects. The idea is to ‘play’ in the sandpit 
with new colleagues and see what arises. A discrete amount of funding is then allocated to selected projects 
following a competitive grant submission process. 
69   Heavey, above n 11, 122–124. 
70   It is worth noting that this is not necessarily new. There are many working in science or bioethics who have 
qualifications in more than one discipline. 
71   Heavey, above n 11, 122, 125. 
72   Ibid 125. 
73   Thanks to Dr Jane Calvert for this point. 
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Synthetic biology research is inherently inter-disciplinary. The range and scope of its 
potential applications, and the varied methodological approaches of those assessing it, mean 
that a single ethical determination of the field’s acceptability is unlikely. However, ethical 
analysis will contribute to discussions on the research agenda and underlying values. Ethical 
analysis will also add a further lens with which to evaluate the implications of this research 
field and its applications. 
 
 
***
 
 
